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Abstract
Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein consider the possibility of a philosophical inquiry of an 
absolutely universal scope—an inquiry into the being of all beings, in Heidegger’s case, and into 
the logical form of everything that can be meaningfully said, in Wittgenstein’s. Moreover, they 
both raise the worry that the theoretical language by means of which we speak of particular 
beings and assert particular facts is not suitable for this task. And yet their own philosophical 
work seems to include many assertions of ordinary, theoretical language. Are they being 
inconsistent? Or are they hoping to use theoretical language in a way that conveys what cannot 
be said in that language? Much of the scholarship on each of these thinkers takes the form of one 
of the two horns of this dilemma. In the context of Wittgenstein scholarship, however, a third 
alternative has been proposed: the “resolute” reading of the Tractatus. My aim is to establish the 
availability of a similar solution to Heidegger’s predicament. It will emerge that Heidegger 
rejects the possibility of a theoretical account of being and pursues a project of a radically 
different sort, whose goal is to bring about a transformation of our fundamental relation to being. 
1. Introduction
Heidegger’s stated goal in Being and Time is to reawaken the question of being and thereby to 
effect a thoroughgoing revolution in philosophy. The task is all the more formidable given how 
radically Heidegger differentiates the approach of philosophers hitherto and the true nature of 
philosophy as he understands it. While philosophers have often taken themselves to be concerned 
with being, their theories failed to secure the proper access to the subject matter of their inquiry, 
and they ultimately ended up speaking of being in terms that are only appropriate for beings. 
Indeed, as Heidegger understands it, the ontological difference between beings and being runs so 
1
deep, that it places in question the very possibility of the language of philosophy. Since in his 
view the very language used by philosophers distorts the true object of their inquiry, it becomes 
urgent for Heidegger to inquire into the possibility of a mode of discourse that is capable of 
avoiding such distortion. 
In responding to this challenge, Heidegger differentiates between being and beings and the 
kinds of discourse that make each of these topics accessible. But that is not all; he also proposes 
to distinguish two kinds of truth: the truth of assertions about beings and a more fundamental, 
ontological notion of truth (SZ, 223).  The theoretical use of language, Heidegger holds, is only 1
capable of producing truths about beings, but it is not suited to address being. However, 
Heidegger himself seems to use theoretical language in his analyses of the ontology of Dasein. 
Several of Heidegger’s readers have speculated that by coming to recognize this inconsistency 
Heidegger was led to abandon his plans to complete the project begun in Being and Time.  2
Alternatively, Heidegger has been taken to hold that despite their ultimate ineffability, genuine 
ontological insights can nevertheless guide the philosopher’s theoretical activity.  But by 3
endowing ineffable insights with this guiding and grounding role for expressible theories, the 
radical distinction that Heidegger draws between ontic and ontological truth would be effaced. 
Neither horn of the dilemma furnishes us with a compelling picture of the radical vision and 
singular achievement of Heidegger’s early magnum opus. 
My aim in this paper is to spell out the shape of a third alternative to this apparent dilemma. 
To that end, it will prove useful to consider the striking structural similarity between Heidegger’s 
alleged predicament and the predicament that is often attributed to the early Wittgenstein. Just as 
Heidegger realizes that the being of beings is not itself a being, and that the language that is apt 
for discussing beings inevitably distorts our understanding of being, Wittgenstein came to 
recognize that the logical form of language cannot be treated as the object of descriptive 
propositions: insofar as all language is informed by logic, any attempt to theorize about logic by 
means of language is bound to miss its mark.  Indeed, Wittgenstein frames the aims of the 4
 References to Sein und Zeit (Heidegger 2001) are abbreviated ‘SZ’; references to volumes of 1
Heidegger’s collected writings are abbreviated ‘GA’ followed by the volume number. All 
translations from Heidegger’s work are my own.
 See Dahlstrom 2001, 208–9, Blattner 2007 and McManus 2013a. 2
 See Dahlstrom 1994, Streeter 1997 and Witherspoon 2002.3
 This is what Ricketts 1985 terms “the logocentric predicament”. See Wittgenstein 1960, 4.12; 4
all references to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are henceforth abbreviated as ‘TLP’ followed by 
paragraph number, except when citing the Preface, pp. 26-27.
2
Tractatus in terms of an inquiry into the very idea of drawing the limits of thought and of 
language (TLP 5.61 and p. 27). Standard readings of the book take it to tackle this task by 
constructing a theory of meaning which specifies the logical structure of all propositions that 
have sense, thereby delimiting the realm of everything that can be said meaningfully, i.e. that can 
be either true or false. But according to this putative theory of meaning, the claims that spell out 
the theory do not themselves belong in the language which they govern, and hence, properly 
speaking, which is what leads Wittgenstein, on this reading, to declare his own propositions to be 
nonsensical (TLP 6.54). And this seems to amount to an admission of an irresolvable 
inconsistency. For if Wittgenstein’s propositions are nonsensical, how can they express anything, 
let alone spell out a theory of meaning? And without such a theory, what ground could there be 
for declaring Wittgenstein’s theoretical propositions to be nonsensical? Wittgenstein appears, on 
this reading, to deal himself a “self-mate”, or to cut the branch on which he himself is sitting.  In 5
seeking to save Wittgenstein from the inconsistency, some of his standard readers point to the 
distinction he draws between what can be said by means of propositions, and what shows itself, 
but cannot be said (TLP 4.121–4.1212, 6.124). The distinction is taken to allow Wittgenstein to 
justify the book’s explicit claims by appeal to an ineffable, non-discursive, or even mystical 
vision of the underlying metaphysical structure of language and reality.   6
An alternative to this apparent dilemma has been proposed by authors such as Cora 
Diamond and James Conant, whose interpretation of Wittgenstein has come to be called the 
resolute reading of the Tractatus. According to the resolute reading, both sides of the dilemma 
(i.e. both the interpretation of Wittgenstein as inconsistent and the interpretation that ascribes to 
him a mysterious appeal to the ineffable) share an underlying, common assumption, namely that 
Wittgenstein’s goal is ultimately theoretical in nature. But as the resolute reading points out, 
Wittgenstein himself asserts that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity consisting in the 
elucidation of language and thought (cf. TLP 4.112, 6.54). The goal of elucidations, on the 
resolute reading, is to lead philosophers to overcome their own confusions by means of a 
transformation of their use of language, rather than to provide them with new knowledge.  7
 The inconsistency is termed a “self-mate” in Geach 1976, 54; it is described in terms of cutting 5
the branch on which one is sitting in Hacker 2000, 356.
 See Anscombe 1959, 162, as well as Hacker 2001, who writes that “In the course of the book, 6
Wittgenstein asserts many different kinds of truths that stricto sensu cannot be said, but that are 
held to show themselves in features of the symbolism” (146).
 Diamond 1991a and 2000; Conant 1989.7
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Might there be a similar, third alternative to Heidegger’s apparent dilemma? While certain 
similarities between the predicaments faced by Wittgenstein and Heidegger have been noted in 
the literature, this third option has not been given appropriate consideration.  Indeed, Heidegger 8
might seem more deeply committed to the theoretical conception of philosophy than 
Wittgenstein is, insofar as he frames his central concern in Being and Time, fundamental 
ontology, in terms of providing an analysis of the temporal structures that underlie Dasein’s 
understanding of being (SZ, 17). Moreover, the very idea of ontological truth, a truth which 
outstrips our capacity to frame truth-evaluable assertions, might seem to be the epitome of 
ineffability. What other sense might there be in speaking about a kind of truth that does not attach 
to assertions? If Heidegger does aim to replace philosophical theory with philosophical therapy, 
where precisely does he do that, and how?
I believe these concerns and questions can be adequately answered, and that a reading of 
Being and Time can be offered according to which Heidegger resolutely avoids taking his 
philosophy to consist in providing his readers with an ontological theory. Heidegger’s purpose is 
to help us, his readers, overcome the metaphysical distortions to which we are all prone and 
which lead us to treat being in terms that only fit beings. He hopes to achieve this not by 
communicating a theory of being (which would either be inconsistent, or involve the indirect 
communication of ineffable insights) but by promoting a completely different kind of 
philosophical activity, which is not theoretical but (in a sense to be clarified below) ethical. The 
result of such philosophical activity is a transformative experience, not an epistemic 
achievement.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In the next section (2) I look at Heidegger’s critique of 
traditional metaphysics, and in particular at his rejection of the philosophical employment of the 
discourse of theoretical assertions. Heidegger’s distinction between the truth of assertions and 
ontological truth, which he accuses the metaphysical tradition for neglecting, is the topic of 
Section 3. I there argue that ontological truth must not be assimilated to an object of theoretical 
knowledge, and cannot even be taken to serve as an ineffable source of justification for 
expressible theoretical claims. In Section 4 I spell out the shape of the dilemma Heidegger seems 
to face and consider the way recent readers of Heidegger have reacted to it. In Section 5 I revisit 
the parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein and show how the resolute reading of the 
 The parallels between the dilemmas allegedly faced by Heidegger and Wittgenstein are noted, 8
for example, by Dahlstrom 1994, 788. Comparisons of the two thinkers that consider the 
possibility of a third alternative to the dilemma include Witherspoon 2002, McManus 2012 
(Chapter 9), McManus 2013a and 2013b and Egan 2019 (Chapter 7). All of them conclude that 
such an alternative was not pursued by Heidegger.
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Tractatus succeeds in escaping the Wittgensteinian dilemma. Section 6 is concerned with 
Heidegger’s methodological discussions; I argue that they are best understood in light of his 
having pursued a resolute alternative to the traditional, theoretical approach to philosophy. I 
highlight three elements of Heidegger’s method. In 6.1 I consider Heidegger’s insistence that the 
essence of philosophizing is to be found in the activity of questioning. In 6.2 I consider 
Heidegger’s suggestion that his philosophical expressions are “formal indications” (formale 
Anzeigen), rather than theoretical assertions. I argue that the method of formal indication, like 
Wittgenstein’s method of elucidation, is not a means for the communication of knowledge, but a 
vehicle of transformation. In 6.3 I turn to Heidegger’s proposal that the positive results of his 
inquiry must be subjected to the method of interpretative “destruction” (Destruktion). I argue that 
the point of Destruktion is to bring us to see our own philosophizing as a historically situated 
happening, to take a critical distance from its apparent results, and thereby to transform our 
relation to what these results purport to be about, namely being.  9
2. Being and Language 
We can begin to see what kind of philosophical activity Heidegger took himself to pursue by 
considering the kind of philosophical activity that he rejected. The main target of Heidegger’s 
critique of traditional metaphysics, as it is presented in his seminars as well as in Being and 
Time, is the recurrent failure to respect the ontological difference between being and beings.  10
Heidegger traces the roots of this failure to the language of metaphysics; he argues that the 
particular kind of use of language employed by traditional philosophers prevents them from 
properly engaging with being. ‘Logos’ (λόγος) is Heidegger’s term for the discourse of true and 
false assertions about beings, and it is this use of language that he takes to be privileged in 
 Since my focus in this paper is on Being and Time (1927), I mainly rely on texts stemming 9
from the period in which Heidegger developed the ideas presented in the book as well as the 
period immediately following its publication, in which Heidegger continues to reflect on its aims 
and methods (roughly 1916–1931). I believe that the claim that Heidegger seeks an alternative, 
non-theoretical conception of philosophy would be much easier to establish with reference to 
Heidegger’s later work; but I leave this task for a different occasion. 
 The first explicit mention of the term ‘ontological difference’ occurs in the 1927 seminar, 10
GA24; but its presence in Being and Time and earlier seminars is palpable. See e.g. SZ, 35 and 
201. 
5
metaphysics over all others.  It is important to see, however, that in criticizing logos Heidegger 11
is not advocating the rejection of logic — i.e. of the principles of thought as such — whatever 
such a rejection might mean. Indeed very often Heidegger puts the terms “logic” and “logical” in 
scare quotes, to signal that his target is a particular interpretation or theory of logic, not logic as 
such (SZ, 10 and 160, GA32, 142). His aim is to reject the privileging of a restricted fragment of 
language, the “logic of a specific mode of address” (GA62, 397).  12
Heidegger accuses metaphysicians of treating logos as the exclusive medium of all 
ontological inquiry, and proceeding as though the activity which produces logos (‘legein’, 
λέγειν) exhausts all meaningful engagement with being. Here is how Heidegger spells out the 
target of his critique:
λέγειν… is the guiding thread (Leitfaden) for eliciting the structures of the being 
of a being that is encountered in addressing and speaking. (SZ, 25). 
…in the decisive beginnings of antique ontology logos functioned as the only 
guiding thread for the access to that which is genuinely an entity, and for the 
determination of the being of such entity (SZ, 154).13
One outcome of the metaphysical privileging of the logos of assertion, according to Heidegger, is 
the failure to attend to other manners in which beings are revealed, e.g. through other modes of 
discourse, such as requesting, praying, commanding, and, importantly, questioning (SZ, 32). By 
giving priority to logos, the metaphysician’s gaze becomes fixed on the narrow range of 
 SZ 25 and 154, GA17 20, GA19 224, GA22 155, GA29/30 424, GA32 142. Notoriously, this 11
critique of logos leads Heidegger to deploy an ostensibly “anti-logical” rhetoric; the polemic 
reaches an extreme in the his 1929 inaugural lecture, “What is Metaphysics?” (GA9, 103-122), 
but it is anticipated in Being and Time and in earlier seminars.
 Witherspoon (2002) helpfully clarifies this point in the following way: Heidegger 12
distinguishes between logic, understood as the set of principles that guide all thinking, and logic 
understood as an established formal discipline which is primarily concerned with assertions and 
which is accompanied by an ideology according to which what this studies exhausts all there is 
to say about logic. Heidegger’s critique primarily applies to this ideology. 
 It seems to be no coincidence that in these paragraphs Heidegger speaks of a “guiding thread” 13
— it is probably Kant’s “metaphysical deduction” that he has in mind, in which Kant takes his 
guiding thread from the traditional logical table of judgments in order to spell out the highest 
determinations of all beings, namely the categories. 
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phenomena which logos is best suited to articulate — substances and their categorial properties, 
i.e. beings that are present at hand (Vorhandensein):
… λέγειν itself, as well as νοεῖν – the simple apprehension of something given 
in its pure presence at hand, that Parmenides already took as the guide to the 
interpretation of being — has the temporal structure of the pure “being present”. 
The being, which shows itself for it and which is understood as the genuine 
entity, thereby receives its interpretation with a view to its being present, that is, 
it is understood as presence (οὐσία) (SZ 25–6). 
Logos brings to the fore the specific temporality of the constant presence of substance. So by 
privileging logos, the metaphysical tradition has come to treat the constantly present substance as 
the primary kind of being in relation to which all other beings (as well as being) are to be 
understood. 
It is because it is particularly fit for representing the present at hand (Vorhandensein) that 
logos fails to appropriately represent beings which belong to other modes of being, for instance 
the ready to hand (Zuhandensein) (SZ, 157). But not only does logos fit only certain kinds of 
beings and not others; more importantly, logos is unfit to address being:
Because for the Greeks, for Plato as well as for Aristotle… all assertions are 
understood as mundane assertions, it transpired that being itself, insofar as it 
came into view, was conceived of as a being (GA21, 410n; cf. SZ 32 and 154). 
The upshot of Heidegger’s critique is therefore the following. By taking the logos of assertion as 
their guiding thread, philosophers have prevented themselves from achieving their own stated 
goal, namely to inquire into being, for the prioritization of logos effaces the ontological 
difference between beings and being.
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3. Two Kinds of Truth
Heidegger takes himself to offer a radical alternative to this metaphysical approach. To this end, 
he draws a distinction between two kinds of truth — the truth of assertions and ontological truth. 
The metaphysical prioritization of logos, he proposes, makes the truth of assertions seem as 
though it were the single, defining goal of all philosophical activity: “assertion came to count as 
the primary and genuine “locus” of truth” (SZ, 154). Now Heidegger does not deny that 
assertions are a locus of truth. Through assertions we disclose entities as being thus and so, and 
thereby say true or false things about them. But the manner in which assertions do that, 
Heidegger holds, is grounded in a more fundamental form of disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), 
which is not a property of assertions at all, but a mode of being of Dasein. In this primordial 
sense, truth is the way in which entities are revealed to Dasein, that is, the manner in which 
Dasein’s  understanding of being—and ultimately Dasein itself—is constituted (SZ, 224–5). This 
original dimension of truth precedes the truth of assertions and grounds it:
Assertion is not the primary “locus” of truth, but rather the other way round, 
assertion as a manner of appropriating of what is uncovered and as a manner of 
being-in-the-world is grounded in the uncovering, in other words in the 
disclosedness of Dasein. The most original “truth” is the “locus” of the assertion 
and the ontological condition of possibility for assertion’s being true or false 
(uncovering or covering over). (SZ 226).14
The distinguishing mark of ontological truth, as opposed to the truth of assertions, is that it 
is not subject to the duality of truth and falsity. This puzzling feature of Heidegger’s  conception 
of ontological truth can be traced back to a similar distinction drawn by Aristotle, which 
Heidegger repeatedly invokes. Aristotle proposes that whereas assertions may be either or false, 
this is not so for all truth. There is another, ontologically more proper notion of truth, that 
concerns the mind’s attainment or failure to attain contact with the simplest elements of reality. 
Failure to possess this kind of truth does not constitute falsity, but ignorance:
 Heidegger’s use of the terms ‘ground’ and ‘condition of possibility’ in this passage seems to 14
me to be problematic; see below.  
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Assertion, like affirmation, states an attribute of a subject, and is always either 
true or false; but this is not always so with the mind (noûs): for the what it is, the 
essence, is not a predication, and is always true. (Aristotle 1984b, 430b)
Truth means to apprehend (noein) these [essences and incomposites], and there is 
no falsity or deception, but only ignorance (agnoia)… (Aristotle 1984a, 1052a)
Heidegger clearly has these Aristotelian texts in mind when he makes the following comments in 
the Introduction to Being and Time:
“True” in the purest and most original sense — that is, that which is solely 
disclosing, and can never be concealing — is the pure noein, the purely 
observational apprehension of the simplest determinations of beings as beings. 
This noein can never conceal, can never be false, though it surely can remain a 
non apprehension, agnoein, a failure to attain the simple, appropriate access (SZ 
33). 
Inspired by Aristotle, Heidegger here proposes that grasping or failing to clearly grasp the 
“simplest determinations of beings” shapes our theoretical point of view and thereby 
predetermines the range of the assertions we are able to rightly or falsely make.  Unlike a failed 15
assertion, which results in falsity, a deficient grasp of being does not result in an intelligible, but 
false grasp of some determinate content, but rather in sheer ignorance (agnoia). In adopting the 
Aristotelian contrast between the duality of assertions (their being true or false) and the non-
duality of ontological truth (its having no intelligible contrast), Heidegger acquires a powerful 
critical tool. It allows him to criticize the assertions of metaphysics not for their being 
determinately false, but for failing to “attain access” to their purported subject matter and hence 
for failing to have any determinate content. 
To put it in Wittgensteinian terms, metaphysical statements are criticized not for being false 
but for being nonsensical (TLP 4.003). Precisely because metaphysics is an attempt to reveal 
 Although Heidegger does not mention Aristotle by name in this part of the Introduction to 15
Being and Time, it is clear that he has the Aristotlean text in mind, for in other places where he 
does refer to Aristotle’s texts explicitly, he uses the same words to elucidate the view. See e.g. 
SZ, 226 and GA21, 170–197.  
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ontological truth by means of a use of language that is only fit for ontic truths, what metaphysics 
achieves, in Heidegger’s eyes, is not a false theory of being, but the concealment of that which it 
set out to reveal. Metaphysics thus does not provide us a theory of being, not even a false one. 
Instead, it is a mode of philosophizing in which being is ignored and covered up, a “perversion” 
(Verkehrung) of the very problems it was supposed to address.  What is needed, therefore, is not 16
to refute the claims of metaphysics, but to transform the way metaphysicians understand what 
they are up to. This, I believe, is what lies behind the distinctive way Heidegger frames the 
project of Being and Time as an endeavor to overcome the “forgetfulness” of being (SZ 2, 21, 
35).  
Heidegger takes the capacity for ontological truth (and correspondingly, for ontological 
ignorance and confusion) to be a constitutive feature of Dasein’s historical way of being. Dasein 
as such is defined by its concern with being, that is, by its capacity to disclose ontological truth 
(SZ, 13), and such disclosure is historical in nature (SZ 222, 226); but this capacity can be 
exercised either authentically or inauthentically. Thus the metaphysical failure to draw the 
ontological difference can be traced back to the inclination of average, everyday Dasein to 
understand itself and its being in terms of other beings (Verfallenheit). In its average 
everydayness, Dasein fails to face up to its being; instead of securing proper access to being, it 
applies the logos of assertion to it. The metaphysical theories that arise from such failure are not 
to be criticized for producing theoretically false propositions; rather, they are criticized for being 
a symptom of a corruption of the personality (GA29/30, 423, 426), that is, for being an ethical 
failure. 
In the mode of authentic resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), by contrast, Dasein overcomes 
this tendency. For in being resolute, rather than attempting to explain the ultimate ground of its 
being in terms of this or that being, Dasein comes face to face with its own groundlessness: it 
finds nothing — no entity — that it can appeal to as the ultimate ground of its being (SZ, 306).  17
In its resolve Dasein thus confronts being without treating any being as its ground, and hence 
without confusing being for a being: resolute Dasein confronts being as such. To avoid the 
metaphysical distortion of ontological truth which it thereby reveals, resolute Dasein must avoid 
employing the theoretical mode of discourse; indeed, it must withhold all speech (SZ, 165 and 
 Heidegger speaks of the effacement of ontological differences in terms of perversion in SZ, 16
11, 115 and 158. 
 This is the sense in which (as I noted above) it seems to me to be problematic for Heidegger to 17
speak (as he does in SZ, 226) of ontological truth as a “ground” and a “condition of possibility” 
of ontic assertions. 
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296). Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, thus proposes that concerning that which cannot be talked of 
without distortion, one must remain silent (TLP 7). 
Heidegger himself should be read as someone who, in his own philosophizing—that is, in 
writing Being and Time—aims to escape the fallenness of the metaphysical inclination and the 
perversions it invites. But he does not deflect from the reality of the corrupt human tendency to 
employ theoretical logos in the account of being, and thereby to distort ontological truth. To 
resolutely face up to this tendency for corruption is to seek a radically alternative understanding 
of the nature of philosophy. 
4. The Apparent Dilemma Between Inconsistency and Ineffability
As we have seen, Heidegger holds that the language used in metaphysical theorizing is limited, 
and that these limits preclude the possibility of providing a theory or a concept of being. Indeed, 
given the radicality of the ontological difference between being and beings, there could be no 
single language that can addresses both, and so it is unclear whether there could even be a single 
language in which one could properly draw the ontological difference itself. This predicament 
has been aptly termed “the paradox of thematization” by Daniel Dahlstrom.  One type of 18
reaction among scholars of Heidegger has been to accuse him of an inconsistency: Heidegger 
seems to aim at providing an account of being, the implication of which is that there could not be 
such an account. Denis McManus, for instance, takes this inconsistency to be insurmountable, 
and holds that it is precisely this issue which led Heidegger to abandon the project of Being and 
Time.  19
A second type of reaction consists in retaining the negative claim about the theoretical 
inexpressibility of being, while resisting the conclusion that Heidegger’s own project is just as 
problematic as the metaphysics that he criticizes. Thus Heidegger is taken to overcome the 
strictures of theoretical logos by relying on ineffable insights and seeking to communicate them 
indirectly. Dahlstrom 1994 and Streeter 1997, for example, suggest that Heidegger overcomes 
the difficulty of communicating ontological insights by employing an indirect use of language, 
which they associate with the method Heidegger calls formal indication.  According to 20
 Dahlstrom 1994.18
 McManus 2013a; cf. Blattner 2007.19
 I offer a different construal of formal indication in section 6.2 below. 20
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Witherspoon 2002, it is the recognition of the failure of theoretical assertions to capture 
ontological subject matter that leads one to an appreciation of ineffable ontological insight. How 
we should make sense of the ineffable insights that are presupposed by these accounts is a 
question I will leave aside; I will focus instead on the systematic role these ineffable insights are 
taken to play within the context of Heidegger’s inquiry. Just as on the first approach, Heidegger 
is here taken to aim at providing a theoretical account of some sort, only in this case the ultimate 
justifications of his theoretical account are taken to consist in insights that do not properly belong 
within it. Kris McDaniel makes this idea explicit in arguing that the radical distinctions 
Heidegger recognizes between different kinds of entities dictate the shape of Heidegger’s 
ontological theory, even though they cannot be coherently expressed within it; he proposes that 
these distinctions can nevertheless be introduced by means of a “minimal use” of ontological 
terms.  The ineffable insights are thus taken to deliver some kind of determinate content that can 21
ground and guide the framing of explicit theoretical claims. Without themselves being theoretical 
statements, for all intents and purposes they do play the logical role that theoretical statements 
have, namely that of serving as grounds from which other, statable truths follow. In other words 
they are all taken to belong in one logical space. But for this to work, the ontological difference 
and the distinction between the theoretical language of beings and the language of being must be 
severely weakened or even effaced.
One way in which some readers of Heidegger have attempted to avoid the dilemma 
between these two ways of construing his aims is by denying that he ever meant to pose 
insurmountable strictures on theoretical logos of the kind I have outlined above. Schear 2007 and 
Golob 2015 thus argue that theoretical logos is not limited to the representation of present at 
hand beings (Vorhandensein), at least in the sense that it can also be used to represent other kinds 
of beings, such as the ready to hand (Zuhandensein). But their arguments leave untouched what I 
consider to be the fundamental point, namely that logos is inapt for addressing being. This claim, 
that logos cannot express being, has been attacked by Stephan Käufer, who argues that it is 
wrong to attribute it to Heidegger. Käufer cites as evidence Heidegger’s claim that assertions 
about beings give voice to being (GA29/30 466 and 521).  Indeed, there is no denying that for 22
Heidegger assertions about beings have the capacity to manifest the being of those beings in 
some way—this is precisely what the critique of logos brings out, namely that the logical form of 
theoretical assertions forces their users to depict all beings as having the being of presence at 
hand. But this does not mean that there can be theoretical assertions that are properly about 
 McDaniel 2009, 311. For further discussion, see McManus 2013a, 669.21
 Käufer 2005, 491.22
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being, and it is this that Heidegger excludes when he argues that logos is exclusively concerned 
with the present at hand.  Notably, Käufer, Schear and Golob all share the assumption that 23
underlies the dilemma that they seek to reject, namely that Heidegger’s philosophical aim is to 
provide a theory of some form.   
In what follows I will not attempt to offer further arguments for the claims that metaphysics 
is restricted to theoretical logos, and that logos is restricted to the representation of the present at 
hand, such that any attempt to construct a theory of being would violate the ontological 
difference. Instead, my aim will be to show that even if these claims are admitted, this does not 
saddle Heidegger with the dilemma between inconsistency and ineffability, so long as 
Heidegger’s aims are not construed in terms of providing a theory of being.  24
What is needed in order to bypass the dilemma between inconsistency and ineffability is to 
construe Heidegger’s goals in terms that radically distinguish his concern with being from the 
concerns of traditional metaphysics. What must be shown, in other words, is that Heidegger does 
not think of ontological truth as an object of theoretical knowledge. Moreover, it needs to be 
shown that he differentiates genuine philosophical discourse from theoretical logos not merely in 
terms of their subject matter, but also in terms of their functions and aims. I have hinted at the 
shape of this alternative construal of Heidegger’s aims in the previous sections, where I argued 
that by contrast to the attainment of theoretical truth and falsity, the attainment of ontological 
truth (or its perversion) consists in a total transformation of Dasein and its relation to its world. I 
proceed to elaborate the methodologies through which Heidegger aims to achieve this goal in 
Section 6. But before I go on to do that, I wish to spell out more clearly the shape of this 
 Similarly, Wittgenstein suggests that any assertion presupposes that we grasp its logical form, 23
even though that form is not what the assertion is about, and he then goes on to argue that no 
assertion can be about logical form (TLP 4.12). I say more about this in the next section. 
 Priest 2015 and Casati 2019 construe Heidegger’s later work as providing a different 24
alternative to the dilemma. According to them, in his later work Heidegger abandons classical 
logic, and embraces dialetheism; this allows him to hold on to the inconsistency inherent in the 
attempt to theorize about being. Since my interest in this paper is with Being and Time, and since 
in any case the dialetheist reading does not seem to apply there, I leave the consideration of this 
alternative for a different occasion. 
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alternative to the apparent dilemma between inconsistency and ineffability, by developing the 
parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein.   25
5. How the Resolute Reading Escapes the Apparent Dilemma
My construal of Heidegger’s project in terms which make it immune to the dilemma between 
inconsistency and ineffability is inspired by the way in which the resolute reading of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus responds to a similar impasse.  Wittgenstein, too, accuses 26
metaphysically minded philosophers for seeking to theoretically ground that which does not 
admit of grounding. Like Heidegger, who thinks that the being of beings is falsified when one 
attempts to address it by means of the logos of assertion, Wittgenstein holds that logic is falsified 
wherever one conceives of it in ways that make it appear as the topic of substantive theoretical 
propositions (TLP 6.111). By contrast, Wittgenstein proposes, “logic must take care of itself” 
(5.473); the intelligibility of our discursive practices does not depend on any substantive 
theorizing, for language is in perfect logical order just as it is (5.5563). And yet it has seemed to 
many readers — I will refer to this as the “standard” reading of the Tractatus — that 
Wittgenstein does attempt to offer a theory that “takes care” of logic, namely by constructing the 
logical syntax of a language which excludes nonsense. But what this syntax would exclude, such 
readers acknowledge, includes the sentences with which the theory itself is introduced.  The 27
standard reading of the Tractatus thus gives rise to the by now familiar dilemma: either 
Wittgenstein is being inconsistent, or he takes himself to ground his theoretical claims on what, 
according to his own view, is ineffable.
 Although Witherspoon 2002 and Egan 2019 acknowledge that a resolute Wittgensteinian 25
approach might succeed in resolving the predicament Heidegger faces, they deny that Heidegger 
takes this route. McManus 2013b briefly considers the same possibility, but rejects it; he seems 
to also reject the resolute reading of the Tractatus as such. All these interpreters fail to take into 
account crucial pieces of evidence that I propose to consider below; for instance they do not take 
into account the role played by the method of Destruktion within the project of Being and Time.
 For examples of the resolute readings see Diamond 1991a and 2000, and Conant 1989. For an 26
overview of the debate and a survey of the various positions, see Goldfarb 2011 and Bronzo 
2012. For a defense of the traditional reading see Hacker (2000 and 2001). For the resolute 
readers’ replies to their critics see Conant and Diamond 2004 and Diamond 2005. 
 Proponents of this reading include Geach 1976 and Hacker 2000.27
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The resolute reading of the Tractatus, by contrast to the standard reading, takes 
Wittgenstein at his word when he says that the kind of philosophy he pursues in the Tractatus is 
not theoretical in nature:
4.112   The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations (Erläuterungen). 
The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical propositions”, but to 
make propositions clear. 
Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise 
are, as it were, opaque and blurred. 
Since Wittgenstein’s purpose is not to advocate theories, the Tractatus is neither to be read as 
inconsistently attempting to do what it takes to be impossible, nor as an attempt to justify a 
logical theory by appeal to some ineffable ground. Philosophy, as Wittgenstein conceives it, is 
not a theory at all, but an activity of elucidation. On the resolute approach, the sole aim of the 
elucidatory sentences of the Tractatus is to remove philosophical confusion, by leading 
philosophers to reach clarity in their use of language and thereby recognize the confusedness of 
their own metaphysical claims. This is to be achieved not by means of theoretical argument but 
by means of elucidations, that is, through a form of philosophical therapy, or spiritual exercise.  28
According to Wittgenstein, metaphysical propositions are nonsensical, though their 
outward appearance may not allow us to easily recognize this. Underlying the metaphysical use 
of words is a failure to assign signs with a determinate meaning, of which the metaphysician, 
who is subject to an illusion of making sense, might not be aware (TLP 5.4733). This is not a 
failure that a theory of logical syntax could prevent from taking place. What is needed in order to 
remedy it is not to reform language, but to help the metaphysician overcome the fundamental 
tendencies (cf. Heidegger’s talk of corruptions of personality) that lead her to imagine that there 
is sense where in fact there is none. The very importance that she imputes to metaphysical 
assertions is an illusory one; and in dispelling this illusion, nothing would be added to the her 
stock of knowledge. Philosophy, rather than providing theories, is an activity whose aim is not to 
 The therapeutic conception of philosophy becomes even more explicit in Wittgenstein’s later 28
work, e.g. see Wittgenstein 2009, #133. On the relevance of this notion of therapy to the 
Tractatus, see Diamond 2000. On Wittgenstein’s place in the long tradition of conceiving of 
philosophical activity as a spiritual exercise, see Hadot 2004.   
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inform but to transform its practitioners, helping them attain a more authentic self-understanding, 
and with it, to attain a state of clarity (6.54). 
The resolute reading of the Tractatus refuses to “chicken out” in face of Wittgenstein’s 
insistence that not only the propositions of metaphysics, but also the expressions of his own 
critique of metaphysics must ultimately be recognized as involving nonsense, and hence must be 
thrown away (6.54).  To chicken out, in this context, would be to think that although the 29
sentences of the Tractatus do not make sense, one could still take them to serve the function of 
conveying genuine insights, namely by pointing to the ineffable underpinnings of the logical 
syntax of language. However, according to Wittgenstein not only the answers that 
metaphysicians propose, but the very problems that they take themselves to address are mere 
illusions of problems (cf. TLP 27, 3.323-4, 6.5, 6.52 and 6.53), and Wittgenstein’s response to 
these merely apparent problems is not to attempt to solve them, but to dissolve them; the clarified 
use of language he aims to impart is one in which such problems would not even seem to make 
sense. To read the Tractatus resolutely, to truly be ready to throw away the ladder, means to see 
that Wittgenstein has no need to ground his elucidatory activity in ineffable insights. The 
elucidation of language can be achieved by means of nonsense even if nonsense fails to convey 
any content, for the dissolution of problems does not consist in a proof that certain words cannot 
be used in certain ways (a proof which would putatively depend on ineffable insights that can 
only be conveyed by nonsense), but rather in bringing the confused thinker herself to recognize 
that she has failed to assign them a determinate meaning, and hence that she herself was only 
under the illusion of sense.30
There are various methods for achieving this aim that Wittgenstein proposes in the 
Tractatus. One central method involves the introduction of new formal notations, which clearly 
reflect logical distinctions and thus prevents indeterminacies of meaning and illusions of sense. 
The introduction of such notations involves elucidatory nonsense, but it need not be taken to 
involve an appeal to ineffable content. This will become clearer by considering the contrast 
between Wittgenstein’s understanding of elucidation by means of nonsense and that of his 
mentor, Gottlob Frege. The way Frege sees it, logical distinctions such as the difference between 
concepts and objects are so fundamental to the logical structure of thought and language that 
they cannot be properly expressed by means of language (Frege 1984). For example, attempting 
 See Diamond 1991a on “Chickening out” and the sympathetic discussion in Goldfarb 2011.29
 For a more elaborate discussion of Wittgenstein’s idea that the problems of philosophy can be 30
dissolved by means of elucidations that are themselves nonsensical, see Nir 2020a.
16
to assert that no concept is an object, we end up grammatically treating concepts as potential 
bearers of objectual properties—even in denying the claim that any concept is an object, we treat 
it as at least intelligible to check whether what is true of all objects is also true of the concept, or 
not. But if the distinction truly captures the fundamental shape of thought, violating it does not 
consist in an intelligible, but false claim, but rather in sheer nonsense. So to take the distinction 
to consist in a true theoretical claim, one whose truth excludes an intelligible, but false 
alternative, would lead to effacing the distinction.  
Frege himself concedes that in his attempt to draw the distinction, “[b]y a kind of necessity 
of language, my expressions, taken literally, sometimes miss my thought”.  But he proposes that 31
despite their defectiveness, his philosophical statements succeed in providing “hints” at to the 
shape of the distinction. The crucial difference between Wittgenstein and Frege on this issue, 
which the resolute reading makes us attentive to, is the following.  Frege’s talk of “hints” makes 32
it appear as if there is some substantive content which is ineffable, and yet successfully conveyed 
by means of his philosophical elucidations—content which we would count as true, if only we 
could express it properly. It is on the basis of what we grasp by means of such hints, Frege holds, 
that we would recognize the correctness of his new logical notation, which is governed by this 
distinction but cannot express it.  Wittgenstein thinks that introducing new logical notations is 33
indeed a powerful means through which we can avoid the ambiguities that are inherent in our 
ordinary use of language, and thereby avoid the slip to metaphysical nonsense. But there is a 
crucial difference between getting someone to adopt an adequate system of signs, and making 
meaningful claims about what such a notation can or cannot express (TLP 3.33-3.331)—by 
contrast to Frege, Wittgenstein thinks one can do the former without the latter (4.126). The 
transformation we would undergo in adopting a use of language which excludes nonsense 
(including the philosophical nonsense that the attempt to spell out the distinction between 
 Frege 1984, 193.31
 Standard readers of the Tractatus such as Geach 1976, Anscombe 1959 and Hacker 2000 32
assimilate Wittgenstein’s understanding of elucidations to Frege’s; by contrast, resolute readings 
such as Conant 1989 and Kremer 2013 bring out the differences. 
 Frege’s approach is analogous to the one McDaniel attributes to Heidegger: the distinctions 33
underlying ontological pluralism are substantive truths, even though, if these distinctions are as 
radical as Heidegger takes them to be, there is no single language in which they can be properly 
asserted. 
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concepts and objects leads to) does not depend on any theoretical insights, expressible or not 
(including the putative insights into the distinctions that underlie language). 
Wittgenstein’s elucidations aim to bring about such transformation by means of a merely 
transitional use of language.  For instance, the elucidation may involve pointing out that in the 34
adequate notation there would be no way to frame claims that efface the distinction between 
concepts and objects (e.g. 4.1272). This claim might initially appear to be contentful—it might 
seem to exclude a genuine possibility, and thereby to convey a genuinely necessary fact. But a 
person who has been helped by elucidations and has adopted a language in which no such 
possibilities appear to make sense would ultimately come to see that the elucidations are 
themselves defective, and involve the same indeterminacies that they were meant to help her 
overcome. In realizing that the elucidations themselves are nonsensical, she would come to 
reject them, to throw them away, without thereby undermining her right to continue to use the 
new notation they introduced (6.54).  
Tractarian elucidations thus manifest a distinctive temporality, which is similar to the one 
manifested by the considerations appealed to by a scientist in the midst of a revolution in the 
foundations of her science.  To demonstrate the failure of her old way of thinking, the scientist 35
must initially continue to deploy the vocabulary that she will ultimately transcend, continuing to 
refer, for example, to what aether may or may not be. But the revolution in the scientist’s way of 
thinking alters the status not only of the theoretical answers that she was previously prone to treat 
as intelligible (e.g., that aether is the medium through which electromagnetic waves move) but 
also the questions that led her to frame such answers (e.g. what is the medium through which 
electromagnetic waves move?). The adoption of a new paradigm involves a transformation of the 
concepts that the scientist took for granted (e.g. waves are no longer understood to require a 
medium), as a result of which both the past answers and the questions they attempted to answer 
lose the appearance that they have a determinate sense. Indeed, not only the expressions that 
spell out the shape of the old paradigm, but also those that lead the scientist to abandon it would 
thereby be deprived of their meaning and use, since they too draw on the vocabulary of the old 
paradigm. Since the elucidations that led to the scientist’s new theory no longer have any role to 
play in it, they would simply be thrown away. 
 On the “transitional” status of elucidations see Diamond 2000, 157. 34
 I have in mind the account of scientific revolutions provided in Kuhn 1962. 35
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As Wittgenstein sees it, philosophical elucidations bring about a similarly far-reaching 
transformative effect. They may result, for instance, in the thinker’s no longer taking her 
existential problems to require a theoretical solution (TLP 6.521, 6.371-2), and in her no longer 
feeling dissatisfaction by her failure to find metaphysical answers to her philosophical questions 
(6.53). Her entire vision of reality may thereby be altered; she would come, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, “to see the world rightly” (6.54). To use Heidegger’s terminology, Wittgenstein here 
comes close to proposing that what elucidations transform is not ontic, but ontological truth. And 
it is in this sense that the results of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, on the resolute reading, are not 
merely negative. Its positive results do not consist in communicating theoretical content (either 
directly or indirectly), but rather in helping the reader achieve a new way of seeing the world, a 
transformed understanding of being.  And yet the resolute reading, so construed, neither 36
requires us to see the project of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as inconsistent, nor to take it to rely on 
ineffable theoretical insights.   
6. Heidegger on the Transformative Goal of Philosophical Activity
In the following sections I will delineate the shape of a resolute reading of Heidegger’s work that 
similarly shows him to avoid both horns of the dilemma he seems to face. But Heidegger himself 
does not explicitly tell us that his own propositions are nonsensical, and this might seem to 
preclude drawing any meaningful parallels between Wittgenstein’s elucidatory method and 
Heidegger’s. Nonetheless, as I will show, Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, does not take his 
philosophical claims to serve a theoretical goal; rather, he takes them to serve the role of evoking 
an activity, the result of which is the transformation of the reader’s understanding. Like 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger acknowledges that the kind of goals he pursues compel him to speak in 
 There are significant differences between the early and the later Wittgenstein when it comes to 36
the question whether philosophical problems could be overcome once and for all, providing an 
unencumbered vision of reality, or only addressed piecemeal (Wittgenstein 2009). Moreover, the 
ultimate clarity that the early Wittgenstein seeks to achieve through philosophical elucidation is 
something which, for the later Wittgenstein, may manifest itself differently at different historical 
moments and for different cultures (Wittgenstein 1969). In these respects, the later Wittgenstein 
is even closer to Heidegger’s philosophy of being than the author of the Tractatus. However, as 
Diamond 2019 shows, there is room, in the Tractatus itself, for a notion of truth that differs both 
from the truth of contingent propositions, and from the truth of empty, logical tautologies. It is 
this notion of truth that I consider to be analogous Heidegger’s ontological truth.
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ways that might mislead his reader to misconstrue what he is up to. And like Wittgenstein’s, 
Heidegger’s reader is asked to subject the author’s propositions to the same form of criticism that 
the author directs against the propositions of metaphysics. For such a reader, Heidegger’s 
assertions will ultimately cease to seem to fulfill a theoretical purpose. Indeed, the reader would 
come to recognize that treating them as theoretical assertions is nonsensical—that it bespeaks, in 
Heidegger’s terms, a perversion of sense, a corruption of the personality, and a forgetfulness of 
being. At least in this sense, the reader would then throw them away.
It is worth emphasizing that the adjective “resolute” is wonderfully suited to characterize 
the manner of philosophizing that Heidegger pursues. For as we have seen, the notion of 
resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is central to Heidegger’s account of the way Dasein establishes 
an ontologically authentic relation to being. The resoluteness of Dasein consists in her not 
flinching from the realization that her own being cannot be grounded, and more generally, that 
being as such cannot be explained in terms of beings. Such flinching would occur were Dasein to 
seek to make theoretical assertions where theory cannot but distort that which it aims to clarify. 
To be resolute, for Heidegger just as much as for Wittgenstein, is to overcome the temptation to 
think of philosophical achievement in metaphysical terms, i.e. as the attainment of substantive, 
theoretical insights (be they expressible or not). Rather, the achievement of resoluteness consists 
in a radical transformation of one’s understanding of being.
Three elements of Heidegger’s conception of philosophical method speak in favor of my 
proposal that the goals he pursues are not theoretical, but ultimately ethical in nature, and that 
therefore his project does not fall prey to the dilemma between inconsistency and ineffability. 
These are (1) his construal of the essence of philosophy as an activity of questioning; (2) his 
discussions of the method of formal indication; and (3) his tripartite methodology of reduction, 
construction and Destruktion. In the context of the present inquiry, I can only briefly introduce 
each of these and point out in what way they bear on the question whether Heidegger is caught in 
the dilemma that the literature tends to ascribe to him. But this should suffice for establishing the 
plausibility of my alternative proposal, and for pointing out directions for future inquiry.     37
 By highlighting the parallels between Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of 37
philosophy I do not wish to deny that there are important differences between their respective 
methods and concerns. To spell out these differences, however, would lie beyond the scope of 
the present paper.  
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6.1. Philosophy as an Activity of Questioning
Being and Time opens by stating its overarching goal, namely to reawaken the now forgotten 
question of being. It is crucial that we do not flatten out and efface the uniqueness, even 
weirdness, of describing the ambition of a philosophical project in this way. It is the question — 
not the answer — which is here said to be what is sought:
To repeat the question of being therefore means: first of all to sufficiently 
elaborate the positing of the question. (SZ, 4) 
Indeed, Heidegger takes pains to avoid the implication that the book ultimately provides an 
answer to this question. For even if every question as such is to be seen as a search that is 
oriented towards finding an answer, what is urgent in the ontological context, according to 
Heidegger, is the activity of questioning itself— an activity which would be brought to a stop by 
the very appearance of having reached an answer. Accordingly, the highest words of praise 
Heidegger reserves for the achievements of past philosophers single out the manner in which 
they have exposed and maintained such an attitude of questioning:
It is necessary to keep everything open and questionable — only so are we able 
to truly liberate and keep awake the unresolved inner questioning of Aristotle, 
and with it of ancient philosophizing, and with it our philosophizing. (GA33, 
47).38
The ontological priority of questioning is one of Heidegger’s earliest and enduring 
commitments. In his very first seminar, held in summer of 1919, Heidegger approaches the 
phenomenology of the experience of questioning by looking at a specific ontological example: 
the question “Is there anything?” (Gibt es etwas?). Heidegger harks back to the Aristotelian idea 
that philosophy starts with wonder (Aristotle 1984a, 982b11): so long as we are concerned with 
such a question, we turn away from our immersive concern with this or that entity, and instead 
wonder at the very existence of the world. But Heidegger moves beyond Aristotle in adding that 
as soon as we start framing answers to such a question, we are bound to reify the object of 
genuine ontological inquiry (GA56/57, 59–69). In light of the critique of theoretical logos he 
 And see the similar assessment of Kant’s greatness in GA3, 838
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develops in later seminars, we can reframe the upshot of this discussion as follows: in giving 
theoretical answers we impose the logos of assertion on the ontological domain that the 
experience of questioning opens up, and thereby distort it. Questioning itself, by contrast, is the 
proper mode of engaging with being, insofar as it allows us to avoid reducing being to beings. 
In Being and Time itself, the priority of questioning over answering might seem to 
gradually recede in favor of the positive project of constructing a fundamental ontology, in which 
self-standing answers seem to be provided. This appearance is at least partly illusory, for note 
that just when Heidegger suggests that an answer to the question of the meaning of being of 
Dasein would be found in the “exposition of the problematics (Problematik) of temporality”, he 
immediately goes on to clarify that such an “answer” will only serve to reframe the problem, and 
thereby indicate a direction for further ontological questioning:
… the answer to the question of being can never be located in an isolated, blind 
proposition. The answer is not grasped in the repetition of that which it 
propositionally says … The answer, according to its proper sense, gives 
instructions for concrete ontological research, to begin the investigative 
questioning within the cleared-up horizon — and that is all it gives. (SZ 19) 
Moreover, in the concluding section of the book, Heidegger says that the value of the entire 
inquiry of Being and Time does not lie in the correctness of its apparent results, but in the extent 
to which it might spark the attitude of fundamental questioning. He then indicates that the work 
would still be of value even if the entire fundamental ontology proposed in it turns out to have 
been the incorrect way to engage with the question of being:
It is not possible to investigate the origin and possibility of the “idea” of being 
as such by means of a formal-logical “abstraction”, that is, without a secure 
horizon of questioning and answering. [Rather,] one must search for a way of 
clarifying the ontological fundamental question [the question concerning the 
fundamental role of the ontology of Dasein for all ontology] and then walk it. 
Whether this is the only, or even the correct way, can only be decided after one 
has walked it. …to this end, the present inquiry is underway. (SZ 437).  
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It thus seems that the author of Being and Time seriously considers the need to ultimately throw 
away the ladder of fundamental ontology — not just after the “turn” in his later philosophy, but 
already in the way he initially meant the book to be read. The rationale for this is clearly stated in 
a seminar from 1928:
The philosophical knowledge of the essence of the world [i.e. of the being of 
beings] is not, not ever, a cognition of something present at hand, but rather the 
conceptual unlocking (das begreifende Aufschließen) of something within a 
determinately directed questioning, which as questioning never lets that which 
is inquired into to become a present at hand. (GA29/30 423).
Philosophy, on Heidegger’s view, is not a theory, but an experience — a way to be walked, a 
sustained activity of questioning. So long as it remains a questioning, philosophy is genuinely 
engaged with being; and the result of such questioning is not a theoretical cognition, but rather 
the clearing up of new horizons of inquiry and new ways of conceptualizing beings. Questioning 
is, in other words, the driver of revolutionary transformations.  
The activity of questioning with which Being and Time opens is not to be brought to a rest 
by the apparent answers that fundamental ontology purports to provide. Indeed, as I will argue 
below, Heidegger deploys the methods of formal indication and of Destruktion in order to 
combat the temptation to construe the achievements of his inquiry in terms of the acquisition of 
incontestable content. He takes this temptation to be ubiquitous in philosophy, and he therefore 
holds that even the claims made within his own analyses in Being and Time should be subjected 
to further critique, which would prevent such misinterpretations of their status. Indeed, 
Heidegger does not always resolutely avoid implying that he achieves self-standing positive 
theoretical results. But I believe that when these passages are placed in the context of the 
methodological considerations discussed here and in the next sections, they can be understood as 
dialectical in nature: while they initially present an image of philosophy as positive science, this 
image is one of the obstacles which are ultimately to be overcome, if one is to secure a proper 
access to being. One example is GA24 (459), where Heidegger speaks of positive results being 
gained by means of his analyses; but in the introduction to this very seminar Heidegger declares 
that the appearance of having reached positive results would have to be subjected to the kind of 
critique he calls Destruktion (whose role I will discuss below). 
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This vision of philosophy as an activity of questioning that transforms our relation to 
being is a radical departure from the kind of theoretical project that is standardly attributed to 
Heidegger. Had he pursued such theoretical goals, no alternative to the dilemma between 
inconsistency and ineffability would have been open to him. But since he himself insists that his 
aims are radically different, and much more ambitious, than to propose a theory of being, there is 
room for this “resolute” reading of Heidegger’s early work.  
6.2. Formal Indications as “Ethical” Tasks 
The predicament that being cannot be addressed by means of theoretical language is not 
something that takes Heidegger by surprise, nor is it something which he realizes only after he 
has settled on his aims and methods or even only after he has completed Being and Time. 
Heidegger’s entire philosophical career, from its earliest days, is informed by an appreciation of 
this difficulty and is designed to overcome it. My two aims in this section are first, to show that 
the method Heidegger calls formal indication is meant to promote the philosophical attitude of 
questioning and thereby serves the transformative goal of disclosing ontological truth. Second, I 
aim to clarify the nature of Heidegger’s goals by bringing out the striking parallels between his 
method of formal indication and Wittgenstein’s method of philosophical elucidation. 
The origins of the method of formal indication can be traced back to Heidegger’s 
Habilitation (1916), where Heidegger is concerned with what he takes to be an incommensurable 
difference between the realm of human existence and the realm of nature; he seeks to establish 
the possibility of a language, a mode of speaking, that will not impose the features of the latter 
on the former (GA1, 255). In his earliest seminars Heidegger continues to engage with this 
theme, by responding to the critique Paul Natorp raised against Husserl’s phenomenology. 
Natorp grants that there are pure phenomenological insights of the sort that Husserl attempts to 
describe, but he objects that one could not communicate such insights by means of theoretical 
language without distorting them.  Heidegger responds by suggesting that phenomenology 39
avoids framing its results in terms of theoretical assertions and instead captures these results in 
mere formal indications.  But this, as I will argue below, need not be taken to mean that what is 40
conveyed by formal indications are theoretical (but ineffable) insights, of the kind Natorp seems 
to have in mind. 
 Natorp 1912, 103; and see the discussions of Natorp’s objection and Heidegger’s response in 39
Van Buren 1994, 325 and O’Rourke 2018.
 GA56/57,. Formal indication is extensively discussed in GA61, 32–35 and 140–155. 40
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The contrast between theoretical assertions and formal indications is stressed in Being and 
Time as well, where Heidegger reminds the reader that the positive claims he is making should 
not be treated as theoretical assertions. For example he asserts that to treat his claims about the 
existential structures of Dasein as theoretical assertions would be to succumb to Dasein’s 
inauthentic tendency to misinterpret itself in terms of the other kinds of entities that surround it 
(Verfallenheit) (SZ, 314–5).  A proper inquiry into being should not involve any free-floating 41
theoretical assertions, but must rather take the form of a hermeneutic circle that involves the 
interpreter in that which she interprets; each apparent claim would serve, for the ideal reader of 
Heidegger’s book, as a formal indication, that is, as the basis for further acts of questioning. 
In the seminar of Winter 1929/1930 Heidegger goes on to claim that all the claims he made 
in Being and Time about Dasein, about death, and about nothingness would be misunderstood if 
one took them as descriptive statements, for in fact they are meant as formal indications 
(GA29/30, 428–31). More sweepingly, Heidegger argues that all genuine philosophical concepts 
are merely formally indicative: 
All philosophical concepts are formal-indicative, and only when they are so taken, 
do they result in a true possibility of comprehension. (GA29/30, 425). 
To see how formal indications are supposed to achieve this goal let us consider one specific 
example, namely Heidegger’s discussion of the “as-structure” which underlies all understanding, 
and in particular, the understanding of beings as beings (GA 29/30, 416ff.). Heidegger starts the 
discussion with the indication that the as-structure can in a sense be conceived of as a relation. 
However, he immediately notes (417) that relations are traditionally construed in terms of the 
entities they relate (e.g. in terms of a set of ordered pairs of entities), whereas the “as” of “being 
as being” does not relate two entities at all. It serves to point out an ontological structure, not an 
ontic fact. In this discussion, what starts as an act of comparing the as-structure to a relation turns 
out to require the retraction of this comparison. This is not accidental; the double gesture of 
indication and retraction is designed to invite the reader to see that to take the ontological “as” to 
consist in stating an ontic relation would result in confusion, insofar as it would conflate the 
 See also SZ, 114, 115, 117 and 313; relatedly, see the discussion of “formalization” of the 41
phenomenon of guilt (Schuld), in SZ, 283. And see the discussions in Kisiel 1993, Dahlstrom 
1994; Burch 2011; and O’Rourke 2018. 
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formal and material, the ontological and the ontic (like Frege’s attempt to draw the distinction 
between concepts and objects in terms that only fit objects, the result would be nonsensical). 
Heidegger dubs this double gesture of formal indication its “referring-prohibitive” 
characteristic.   42
A second feature of formal indications that comes out in Heidegger’s discussion is that 
rather than communicating content, a formal indication merely aims to set up a task (Aufgabe): 
Nonetheless we can continue to call the “as” a relation, and speak of the “as”-
relation. We must however keep in mind that the formal characteristic does not 
give the essence, but (on the contrary) only indicates the decisive task, to grasp 
the relation out of its own dimension, rather than to flatten this dimension 
through the formal characteristic. Treating the “as” as a relation does not say 
anything about the “as” as such, but rather only contains the order to take up a 
peculiar task. I therefore speak in relation to such a characteristic in terms of a 
“formal indication” (GA29/30 425).       
As long as we do not confuse it for an assertion, a formal indication will help direct our genuine 
philosophical activity; its role is not to communicate content, but to provoke in us the attitude of 
questioning in which the ontological “task” consists. 
A third crucial feature of formal indications is that their target is essentially personal — 
they address a particular reader, and require her to carry out a task for herself. And a final, fourth 
feature is that by setting tasks for the particular reader, formal indications aim to transform her. 
Both features are highlighted in the way Heidegger describes the intended goals of the analyses 
of Dasein in Being and Time: 
In each of these concepts — death, resoluteness, history, existence — there lies 
the demand of transformation (Verwandlung), not merely as a subsequent so-
called ethical application of that which has been conceived, but as a preliminary 
unlocking of the dimension of that which is conceivable. These concepts are 
 Cf. GA 61, 142 and the discussion in Dahlstrom 1994, 78342
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merely indicative since when they are truly attained, they merely let this 
demand for transformation speak forth, but they are never able to bring about 
this transformation by themselves. They indicate to Dasein. But Da-sein is 
always — as I understand it — my own. And because this indication is 
essentially a pointing to the concretion of an individual Dasein of a human 
being, without carrying any content in them, they are formally indicative. 
(GA29/30, 428–9) 
Much in this passage is obscure, but one point that comes out clearly is that we can only speak of 
a formal indication in connection with the activity of a specific reader who takes up the task 
indicated, and by doing so, engages in a philosophical activity of transforming her concepts, 
thereby altering her relation to being, i.e. her own way of being.  This connects to the point I 43
made earlier, that ontological truth is inextricably the truth of Dasein, that is, that it is embodied 
in Dasein’s existence, as a historical being which is concerned with its own being. Heidegger 
often speaks of the philosophical transformation he aims to enact in terms of a “counter-
movement” to Dasein’s tendency to immerse itself in beings (GA61, 153). He proposes, by 
contrast, that in order to be able to address being, rather than beings, we must undergo a “turn 
(Umstellung) of the understanding” (GA21, 410n.). And he also speaks of his own form of 
inquiry, Fundamental Ontology, as something which must undergo such a “turnaround” 
(Umschlag, GA26 198).  As I will argue below, it is the main task of the method of 44
interpretative destruction (Destruktion) to instigate such a transformation of the philosophical 
inquiry. 
There are deep and fascinating affinities between these four features of Heidegger’s method 
of formal indication—the double gesture of indication and retraction, the setting up of tasks, the 
personal character of their appeal, and their transformative goal—and the central features of 
 For further discussion of the relation between formal indications and transformation, see 43
Dahlstrom 2001, 248–252; van Buren 1995; McManus 2013b, and Egan 2019, 178ff.
 In Being and Time Heidegger also speaks of a turnaround (Umschlag) in a different, though 44
not unrelated sense, namely the transformation of Dasein from the attitude of engaging with the 
ready to hand to the theoretical attitude of assertions about present at hand entities (SZ, 157 and 
357).
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Wittgenstein’s conception of the philosophical activity of elucidation.  Though Wittgenstein’s 45
elucidations might initially appear to convey substantive content, one is meant to ultimately 
recognize their nonsensicality, to retract them and overcome the appearance that that is what they 
achieve. Understood as a transitional use of language, the elucidations—the ladder on which the 
reader of the Tractatus is asked to climb—can be seen as setting up tasks for the reader, who is 
called upon to work through her own confusions, and thereby alter her understanding of the 
terms involved both in her own use of language and in the elucidations themselves. The clarity 
which is thereby achieved does not consist in the obtainment of any truths, however, but in the 
transformation of the philosopher’s own use of language. This does not alter her knowledge of 
the facts, but rather brings her to abandon the expectation that theorizing could ever provide 
answers to her existential concerns. As a result, her problems would dissolve, and her vision of 
reality would be transformed. 
To read Heidegger’s formal indications resolutely, in turn, is not to take him to deploy them 
in order to bypass the predicament spelled out by Natorp, that ontologically contentful insights 
cannot be directly communicated. A formal indication is not an attempt to use language to 
convey ineffable truths that show themselves but cannot be said.  Rather, they are to be seen as 46
a means through which Heidegger hopes to bring himself, and each of us, into the elucidatory 
activity of authentic questioning. The goal of this exercise is not to impart insights, but to 
transform our tendencies to be philosophically complacent, to abuse logos, and to imagine 
ourselves to be in pursuit of theoretical answers to ontological questions, for such answers 
cannot but distort the difference between being and beings. Formal indications, insofar as they 
prevent us from falling into such confusion, transform our ontological truth. 
The achievement of formal indications is in this sense not a theoretical, but an ethical one, 
in the sense I will now attempt to clarify. Admittedly, Heidegger’s Being and Time does not 
engage in what is commonly called “ethics”. The vocabulary by means of which Heidegger 
construes Dasein’s engagement with being—both in the deficient, improper mode of avoiding 
and forgetting it, as well as in the exemplary, authentic mode of facing up to it—is a 
conspicuously ethical vocabulary. The central characterization of Dasein, i.e. of the being who is 
 The similarities between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s respective methods might be due to 45
the fact that they share a common source — namely, Kierkegaard’s discussions of indirect 
communication. On the relation of Heidegger’s method to Kierkegaard’s see van Buren 1995; 
and on the relation of Wittgenstein’s method to Kierkegaard’s see Conant 1993.    
 Pace Dahlstrom 1994, Streeter 1997 and Egan 2019, 192.46
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concerned with its being, is care (Sorge); and Dasein is said to be called upon, by its own 
conscience (Gewissen), to overcome the dissimulation of being that characterizes its fallenness 
(Verfallenheit) and to take responsibility for its ontological guilt (Schuld) (SZ, 284). The care that 
expresses itself in Dasein’s various engagements with beings, Heidegger emphasizes, is neither a 
theoretical nor a practical phenomenon—it belongs at a level that precedes even this fundamental 
division (SZ, 193). It is by reference to this originary level that I here speak of the ethical 
dimension of Heidegger’s work: the transformations he aims to bring about are modifications of 
the ontological care that underlies all our engagements with beings. Indeed, when Heidegger 
much later reflects on the relation of his early work to ethics he proposes that the fundamental-
ontological inquiry into Dasein as the locus of ontological truth, in Being and Time, is to be seen 
as an attempt at an “originary ethics” (GA9, 356).  It is worth mentioning that there is a 47
significant parallel to this in Wittgenstein, who once said that the ultimate point of Tractatus is 
an ethical one. What is ethical about it, in Wittgenstein’s case as in Heidegger’s, is the 
transformative effect it is meant to have on its reader.   48
6.3. Heidegger’s Tripartite Methodology: Reduction, Construction and Destruction   
The third and final element of Heidegger’s conception of philosophy that I propose to consider 
here is the role he gives to the task of interpretative destruction (Destruktion) in the context of 
the methodology of Being and Time. This is an issue which has been downplayed and ignored by 
many of his readers,  even though in the Introduction to the book Heidegger explicitly 49
announces that the preparation of the question of being requires not one, but two tasks, that is, 
that fundamental ontology must be deployed alongside Destruktion (SZ, 15). It is thus often 
assumed that in Being and Time Destruktion is a merely ancillary task, consisting in a critique of 
 On the claim that fundamental ontology is an originary ethics see Nancy 2002; an insightful 47
discussion of the existential and ethical goals of Heidegger’s formal indications is found in 
Burch 2011.
 Wittgenstein’s letter to Ludwig von Ficker from 1919, cited in Luckhard 1979: 94; and see 48
Diamond 2000 and Kremer 2013 for discussion.
 Some notable exceptions are Guignon 1984, Bernasconi 1994, and Pöggeler 1994; I discuss 49
this issue in more detail in Nir 2020b.
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the philosophical concepts handed down to us by tradition.  But on my reading, Destruktion’s 50
contribution to the inquiry is indispensable. It is also often assumed that the manner in which 
Destruktion is concerned with history and tradition is such that it can be neatly separated from 
fundamental ontology. As I see it, this, too, is incorrect. Heidegger proposes that Destruktion’s 
role is to oppose the “absolutizing” (Verabsolutieren) tendency of fundamental ontology, and to 
thereby effect a transformative turnaround (Umschlag) of the mode of investigation (GA26, 197 
& 201). It would do that by allowing us to see our own philosophical activity as a historical 
happening, and to see that we ourselves are complicit in the failures of the metaphysical tradition 
that we seek to criticize. In this sense Destruktion aims to effect a transformation of our 
philosophical personality.   51
This conception of the role of Destruktion is most clearly expressed in Heidegger’s 
reflections on the method of phenomenology in the 1927 seminar, Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology. Heidegger there proposes that phenomenology has a tripartite methodological 
structure, consisting of reduction, construction and Destruktion (GA24, 31). Reduction is the task 
that allows us to turn our gaze from beings to being, that is, the task of drawing the ontological 
difference (GA24, 29). Though in Being and Time the Husserlian term “reduction” does not 
appear at all, Heidegger’s methodological discussions make it clear that drawing an ontological 
difference between beings and being is a precondition of all ontological inquiry (SZ, 35). The 
second element of the method, construction, consists in the analysis of the structures of the being 
of a specific region of beings (GA24, 30), which is precisely the kind of task that fundamental 
ontology is assigned in Being and Time (SZ, 37). Finally, the 1927 Seminar construes 
Destruktion as a self-critique which is internal to the phenomenological method. It is meant to 
apply to the results of the constructive step of the investigation, and thereby allow the 
phenomenologist to come to terms with the historical situatedness of her own investigative 
activity (GA24, 31).  Heidegger thus admits that phenomenology is prone to the same 52
 McNeill 2012 offers an illuminating account of growing importance of Destruktion in 50
Heidegger’s later work, where it is explicitly assigned the essential ontological task of 
uncovering the “history of being.” However, I disagree with McNeill that in the period of Being 
and Time, Heidegger did not already assign to Destruktion a similarly essential role.
 Crowe 2006, 235 similarly argues that Destruktion is meant to effect a personal 51
transformation, and that this understanding of Destruktion goes back to Heidegger’s early work.
 The need for this critical step is not absent from the methodological discussion in the 52
Introduction to Being and Time, although there it is quite implicit. Cf. SZ 22 and 36.
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distortions that he takes traditional metaphysics to fall victim to. For indeed, phenomenology 
does appear to offer substantive results and to frame these in terms of assertions. To this extent, 
Heidegger comes very close to Wittgenstein’s admission that his own elucidations, which 
sometime seem like theoretical assertions, are ultimately to be recognized as nonsensical. 
Subjecting fundamental ontology to Destruktion is similarly meant to remedy the appearance that 
Heidegger’s analyses of Dasein are meant to contribute to a theoretical account of being.  
In articulating the task of Destruktion Heidegger often speaks of it as tracing ontological 
concepts to the historical, concrete situations from which they arise.  And even though part of 53
what this means is that acts of Destruktion consist in a critique of concepts that were handed to 
us by tradition, to suggest that Destruktion is internal to the phenomenological method and that it 
also needs to be applied to fundamental ontology brings out the important fact that Destruktion is 
not concerned with past traditions alone. Destruktion is also (and essentially) meant to make us 
face the concrete historical situation (the “facticity”) of Heidegger’s own, and hence also of our 
own inquiry. By realizing that our own philosophical activity is itself a historical happening we 
should come to realize that the seemingly substantive theoretical results of our inquiry are not 
proper theoretical assertions after all.  Indeed, such a historical reflection on ourselves would 54
help us see these assertions as formal indications, and thereby allow them to spark in us the 
attitude of authentic ontological questioning.  
The essential role of Destruktion in Heidegger’s methodology is thus not to criticize the 
historical past, but to bring ourselves and the historical event from which our own work arises 
into view, and thereby to transform the historical beings that we ourselves are.  The effect it is 55
supposed to have on us is a change of our very personality, and of the way it manifests itself in 
our philosophical pursuits. Destruktion has an indispensable role to play in the context of 
Heidegger’s project, for it helps us reawaken the question of being, keep it an open question for 
us, and thereby alter us and our very relation to being — our ontological truth. 
 Cf. SZ, 23, GA62, 367, GA18, 327, GA22, 172; GA24, 152 and 164.53
 This is implicit in SZ, 36; it is very explicit in GA24, 26 and 31; GA26, 197–198; GA3, 214–5 54
and GA29/30, 495. 
 I argue for this point in more detail in Nir 2020b. 55
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7. Conclusion  
By means of the comparison between Heidegger and Wittgenstein I have argued that rather than 
attempting to provide a theory of being, Heidegger’s ultimate goal in Being and Time is to 
transform us and our tendency to form metaphysical, theoretical, and hence distorted relations to 
being. Since the manner in which he seeks to achieve this goal does not depend on the success of 
any theoretical assertions, it is not inherently inconsistent of him to reject the applicability of 
logos to ontological inquiry. And since his aims are ethical and transformative, rather than 
theoretical, he does not need to appeal to any ineffable insights as the putative source of 
justification of his putative theory. Many questions are left open, but I hope to have at least 
shown that the resolute reading of Heidegger is a plausible alternative to the apparent dilemma 
between inconsistency and ineffability. To see these affinities between Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein is not to deny that there are also significant differences between their approaches, 
their methods and their concerns. Rather, it provides us a better vantage point from which these 
differences can be more clearly evaluated. This, too, is a task for a different occasion.   56
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